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BERT CHARLES THOMAS, 
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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE APPELLANT HAS MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE 
WHERE NECESSARY. 
This appeal does not rely principally on contested findings. 
In the limited instances where the Petitioner contests the 
Court's findings the evidence has been marshaled. Rather, the 
appeal refers to mistaken legal standards employed by the Court 
in connection with: 
1. The custody of the parties1 two children; 
2. The failure to articulate facts to support an early 
termination of alimony; 
3. The failure to conclude, as a matter of law, that the 
family home was a commingled asset; 
4. The failure to conclude that the Respondent dissipated a 
marital asset in the form of cash on hand in the family 
construction company. 
The Court found that, but for the "influence" of Pedro 
Sauer, " . . . it is clearly in the best interests of the 
children to be awarded to Ann Thomas." (emphasis added) (Findings 
of Fact f 79) That finding is not disputed by either party. The 
only findings of fact disputed by the Petitioner relate to Mr. 
Sauer's character. Specifically, the Appellant objects to the 
finding by the Court that Mr. Sauer was a "convicted criminal" 
(Findings of Fact f 77) and, apparently a spouse abuser (Findings 
of Fact 5 78). There is no evidence to support these findings. 
In fact, the Court concludes in its earlier Findings of Fact that 
the spouse abuse charge was simply an allegation, and that Mr. 
Sauer had only been charged with a possession of a firearm, and 
not convicted of that charge (Findings of Fact 5 73). 
There are no findings which would explain the Court's early 
termination of alimony and therefore those findings are not 
contested. The Appellant specifically does not object to the 
findings regarding the amount of alimony. 
The Appellant did, in its principal brief, contest the 
evidence to support the Court's finding that the marital home had 
a value of $150,000 at the time of the marriage. However, the 
Respondent's observation that this objection was not preserved at 
trial by way of an objection, is well taken. Nevertheless, where 
sixty five percent (65%) of the home was constructed during the 
2 
marriage, the home is, as a matter of law, a commingled asset 
which has lost its identity as a separate asset. 
Lastly, the Appellant claims that the Court should have 
found some value to Bert Thomas Construction Company, and its 
hard assets in particular. These assets included cash on hand. 
The Court should have attributed a value to Bert Thomas 
Construction Company which included the cash on hand at the time 
of separation where that cash was dissipated by the Respondent in 
order to pay his support obligations under the temporary order. 
II. 
THE COURT GAVE UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE CHARACTER 
OF A NON-COHABITANT, THIRD PARTY IN CHANGING 
CUSTODY TO THE RESPONDENT. 
Mr. Thomas argues that this was a "close call11 case. The 
Court's findings do not support that argument. The Court 
specifically found that it was clearly in the best interests of 
the children to be awarded to their mother for custodial 
purposes, except for the "influence" of Pedro Sauer. The issue 
is: under what circumstances should the character of a non-
cohabitant third party be determinative of custodial issues? 
The Court found that the relationship between Ms. Thomas and 
Mr. Sauer was "fairly discrete". (Findings of Fact f78). 
Additionally, the evaluators could make no "link" between the 
affair and its impact on the children. (Findings of Fact f 78). 
What is notably missing from any testimony, evidence or Court 
finding is any suggestion that: 
1. Ann Thomas1 parenting ability was impaired; and, 
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2. That Mr. Sauer had somehow injured or harmed the 
children or that Ms. Thomas permitted such behavior. 
In fact the Respondent's own expert, Dr. Jensen, was not 
able to observe any negative impact on the children by virtue of 
Mr. Sauerfs presence. (Trial Transcript Volume 1, Page 64, Lines 
2-17)-1 
The Court did find that this is a complicated case with no 
easy, clear cut answers only because of the undue weight given 
the character or "influence" of Mr. Sauer2. Mr. Sauer was not a 
cohabitant and there was no evidence that his limited exposure to 
the children had negatively influenced them. 
Instead of findings that would demonstrate Ms. Thomas1 
impaired parenting ability, or how Mr. Sauer has impacted the 
best interests of the children, the Court includes pages of 
findings that relate only to Mr. Sauerfs character. These 
findings, in addition to being irrelevant to the issue of 
custody, are troublesome for other reasons. 
First of all, the findings are inconsistent and not 
supported by the evidence. Specifically, the Court notes that 
Mr. Sauer has been charged with criminal behavior and spouse 
^his fact, along with the Statements of Fact of the 
Petitioner in the principal brief and have not been disputed by 
the Respondent/Appellee. 
2Specifically the Court found: "the appearance of Seiior 
Pedro Sauer in an emotional and sexual relationship with Ann 
Thomas during the marriage is a very complicating factor". 
(Finding of Fact J[ 71) (emphasis added) 
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abuse but then goes on to conclude that he is a convicted 
criminal, and that he is an abuser. 
The Court notes that Mr. Sauer is not a citizen of the 
United States. Furthermore, he is Brazilian and that he is 
suave, debonair, irresponsible, and a womanizer and not ". . . a 
positive role model for little Joseph" (Findings of Fact f80). 
It is clear that the Court had some previous impression of 
Brazilian culture and particularly male members of that culture. 
This was the basis for the Court's own examination of Dr. 
Elizabeth Stewart at the time of her testimony (Trial Transcript, 
Volume 2, Page 43, Lines 10-14). The Court was "profoundly 
concerned" over Ms. Thomas1 belief that Mr. Sauer is a positive 
role model. However, that concern is simply a restatement of the 
Court's impression of Mr. Sauer. 
Mr. Thomas suggests that the above findings regarding Mr. 
Sauer "illuminate" deficiencies in Ms. Thomas' parenting ability 
and character. If this is true, the Court did not express that 
conclusion in its findings. Mr. Thomas suggests that the 
relationship shows that Ms. Thomas has an "inability to 
subordinate her own pleasures to the needs of her children". 
Likewise, this does not appear in the Court's findings. 
The Court found that Mr. Thomas was a capable parent, and 
offered a more stable environment to the children. However, the 
evidence suggesting that Ms. Thomas could not offer an equally 
stable environment is, again, Mr. Sauer's character and 
"influence". The argument of Mr. Thomas is circuitous: "Mr. 
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Sauer is a bad influence. Ms. Thomas looks upon him as a 
positive role model. Therefore, Ms. Thomas is less stable because 
Pedro Sauer is a bad influence." Except for the findings 
regarding Pedro Sauer's influence, it is clearly in the best 
interest of the children that their principal custody continue 
with Ms. Thomas. 
Given the lack of findings to support any conclusion that 
the relationship with Mr. Sauer either (1) impairs Ms. Thomas1 
parenting ability; or (2) is not in the best interest of the 
children, there are two conclusions that can be drawn. Either 
the Court overreacted to the finding of infidelity on the part of 
Ms. Thomas or the Court made a custody award based primarily on 
findings regarding Pedro Sauer!s character and nationality, 
rather than the parenting ability of the childrenfs mother. 
Either conclusion constitutes an abuse of discretion. (See Erwin 
v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 1989); Tucker v. Tucker, 
881 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1984); Fontenot v. Fontenot, 714 P.2d 
1131, 1132-33 Utah 1986); and Rule 4-903, (3)(E)(vii) Code of 
Judicial Administration). 
III. 
THE COURT FAILED TO ARTICULATE ANY FACTUAL 
BASIS FOR THE TERMINATION OF ALIMONY AFTER 
THIRTY-SIX (36) MONTHS BEGINNING WITH THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF THE TEMPORARY ORDER. 
The Appellant does not contest the amount of alimony 
awarded. The Court has properly accounted for the three elements 
necessary to establish the amount of alimony. The Court 
successfully accomplished its calculation of alimony "in an 
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attempt to provide the minimum of necessities, comforts or 
luxuries essential to maintain customarily proper status or 
circumstances." (Finding of Fact f 126). However, none of the 
findings that relate to the amount of alimony explain why alimony 
terminated after thirty-six (36) months (much less thirty-six 
(36) months after the commencement of the temporary order). 
Mr. Thomas1 conclusion that "apparently, the trial court 
felt . . . " highlights the problem. We are left to speculate 
what the Court felt or was thinking. In fact, there are no 
findings and there is no evidence which would suggest that 
circumstances of the parties were to change after thirty-six (36) 
months from the entry of the temporary order in such a way as to 
justify the termination of alimony. 
Mr. Thomas goes on to speculate that Ms. Thomas had "some 
temporary expenses to set up her new life." However, there is no 
finding to support that suggestion and there is no citation to 
the record, either. Additionally, any "set-off" expenses would 
have already been incurred during the pendency of this lengthy 
case or could easily be paid from Ms. Thomas1 separate assets 
which she was awarded. 
Mr. Thomas also suggests that there was no showing that Ms. 
Thomas could not meet her financial needs without alimony. 
However, that is the very essence of the Court's finding 
regarding alimony; a finding which is not contested by the 
Respondent and not appealed by the Respondent. 
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This marriage was of longer duration than in Thronson v. 
Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991), and produced one more 
child than in the Thronson case. In the absence of any facts 
which would support a change of circumstances which could be 
anticipated at the time of the trial of this case, alimony should 
continue for a period of time allowed by the statute (equal to 
the duration of the marriage) or until unanticipated events occur 
which call for an earlier termination or modification3. 
IV. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE MARITAL HOME SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN CATEGORIZED AS A MARITAL ASSET 
RATHER THAN A HYBRID SEPARATE/MARITAL ASSET. 
Assuming that the home had a value of $150,000 at the time 
of the marriage, as a matter of law the Court should conclude 
that it lost its identity as separate property. Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) provides for commingling or 
otherwise separate property as a result of the " . . . effort or 
expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or 
protection of that property" by the other spouse. Mortensen v. 
Mortensen at 3 06 (citations omitted). 
The facts of this case clearly distinguish it from other 
cases where the finding of a hybrid separate/marital asset has 
been upheld. In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah 
3At page 21 of the Respondent's brief he suggests that one 
explanation for the early termination of alimony is due to "the 
fault of the parties". The trial Judge noted the provisions of 
§ 30-3-5(7)(b) but did not go on to make any findings whatsoever 
which would connect the fault of either party with the alimony 
award much less explain how fault would impact the duration of an 
alimony award. 
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App. 1994), the trial Court's finding of the hybrid 
marital/separate interest was sustained. However, in that case 
the nature of the property was significantly different than in 
this case. In Schaumberg the property in question was an office 
building owned by Mr. Schaumberg which had been improved during 
the marriage with money obtained by a loan and repaid from 
marital sources (Mr. Schaumberg's income). The improvement to 
the office building there did not approximate the improvements to 
the house in this case. In this case, the home was sixty five 
percent (65%) constructed during the marriage with the personal 
labor and assistance of Ms. Thomas. Additionally, the home was 
placed in the parties' joint names and mortgaged in consideration 
of the parties' joint promise to repay the loan. 
The Court should be given leeway and discretion to determine 
matters such as this, as well as other matters raised on appeal 
in this case. However, there must be parameters and limits. 
These parameters and limits are set on a case by case basis in 
matters such as this. The Court should consider, particularly, 
the nature of this asset, and the fact that it was predominately 
constructed and paid for during the marriage (from marital 
sources). In addition, Ms. Thomas, by her effort, enhanced, 
maintained and protected the property. It should be concluded 
that the Court's earlier pronouncement in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 
supra and its subsequent cases were ignored by the Court. While 
there is no "bright line", this case is, as a matter of law, a 
case for marital property. 
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Mr. Thomas argues that there are extraordinary circumstances 
in this case exempting it from the requirements of Mortensen. 
The Court found no such extraordinary circumstances. Rather, the 
Court simply made its finding to support a hybrid 
characterization of the property. 
THE VALUE OF BERT THOMAS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
SHOULD INCLUDE THE MONEY, ON HAND AT 
SEPARATION, WHICH WAS USED BY HIM TO PAY HIS 
TEMPORARY SUPPORT OBLIGATION. 
It is inconsequential whether the savings account of Bert 
Thomas Construction Company is characterized as a marital savings 
account, or a hard asset of Bert Thomas Construction Company. In 
either case, the Court concluded that the balance on hand at the 
time of divorce would be controlling. This is inequitable. 
Mr. Thomas acknowledged that he used that money during the 
pendency of the case to pay his support obligation pursuant to 
the Court's temporary order. (Trial Transcript, February 26, 
1996, Page 122, Lines 8-19). The average balance in the Bert 
Thomas Construction Company account prior to separation was 
approximately $39,000. This has been reduced to $6,328 at the 
item of trial (Plaintiff's exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10, & 11 and Trial 
Transcript, Volume 2, Pages 99-104). The Court also found that 
Mr. Thomas had "inexplicability" reduced his income, sharply, 
during separation "regardless of the trend of residential 
construction in Utah County, and the previous Bert Thomas 
Construction trend." (Findings of Fact paragraph 104). The 
inescapable conclusion is that Mr. Thomas artificially reduced 
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his receipts and income, and lived off of the available cash on 
hand at the time of separation. 
Mr. Thomas readily admits that he has used the cash to pay 
his temporary support obligation. He does not take issue with 
the claim in the Appellant's principal brief that the use of 
marital assets to pay a temporary support obligation constitutes 
dissipation of that marital asset. It was contemplated that Mr. 
Thomas would pay his temporary support obligation out of his 
earnings. The burden was on Mr. Thomas to explain why his 
earning reduced, in spite of his income trend, and the trend in 
the industry. He failed to do so.(Findings of Fact 5 104). 
VI. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT INCLUDED 
COMPANY NET PROFITS IN THE RESPONDENT'S 
INCOME 
The Respondent appeals the Court's finding that Mr. Thomas 
earned, on average, $69,567 per year for the years immediately 
preceding the separation. Furthermore, the Court concluded that 
income reflected Mr. Thomas' minimum earning capacity based upon: 
1. His income history; 
2. The local trend for residential construction in Utah 
County; and, 
3. The trend in Bert Thomas Construction Company revenues. 
First of all, the Respondent objects to the Court's 
inclusion of company net income and the total income figure. 
Secondly, Mr. Thomas, apparently, disputes the Court's finding of 
fact number 104 which states: 
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"Inexplicably and contrary to the 
Respondent's own testimony, the actual Bert 
Thomas Construction Company revenue has 
declined sharply since separation regardless 
of the trend of residential construction in 
Utah County and the previous Bert Thomas 
Construction trend, see Exhibit 13." 
(Finding of Fact f 104). 
Instead of the methodology utilized by Derk Rasmussen, CPA, 
the expert for the Petitioner, the Respondent relies solely upon 
his tax returns to establish his income. 
Mr. Thomas agrees with the methodology utilized by the Court 
(with the exception of including company net profits) which 
adopted the methodology of Derk Rasmussen, CPA. In determining 
the Respondent's income the Court employed the formula set out in 
§78-45-7.5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) which provides as 
follows: 
§ 78-45-7.5 Determination of Gross Income -
Imputed Income 
(4)(a) gross income from self employment or 
operation of a business shall be calculated 
from subtracting necessary expenses required 
for self employment or business operation 
from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a 
business shall be reviewed to determine an 
appropriate level of gross income available 
to the parent to satisfy a child support 
award. Only those expenses necessary to 
allow the business to operate at a reasonable 
level may be deducted from gross receipts. 
(b) gross income determined under this 
subsection may differ from the amount of 
business income determined for tax purposes. 
(Emphasis added) 
As will appear hereafter, the Respondent's appeal of the 
Court's finding must fail because, among other reasons, he has 
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failed to marshal the evidence in support of the Court's finding 
(see Point I, page 9, Brief of Appellee). 
At the heart of the Respondent's argument is the allegation 
that he "did not receive any benefit from that money", referring 
to the corporate net profit, because it was kept in the 
corporation. This reasoning is in error because: 
1. As the owner of the company Mr. Thomas could withdraw 
these funds at anytime and did so. 
2. These funds were kept in the construction company 
savings account and actually withdrawn by Mr. Thomas during the 
pendency of this case. 
3. Ironically, these are the same funds which were 
dissipated by the Respondent during the pendency of this case 
(see Point V of this brief and the Appellant's principal brief). 
4. The Respondent's argument leaves the impression that the 
Court added back the cash reserve balance year after year to 
determine the Respondent's income. This is not the case. The 
Court simply included corporate net profits, not the entire 
reserve account balance. The cash reserve account reflected some 
retained earnings or profits. In any given year, some of the net 
profits may have been disbursed to Mr. Thomas and the remainder 
kept as a reserve account or retained earnings. Likewise, in 
any given year (such as after separation) the Respondent could 
and did draw upon the reserve account representing accumulated 
net profit. 
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5. Once the corporation had a reasonable cash reserve there 
was no reason not to disburse net profit from subsequent years. 
As of 1989 the corporation had nearly $30,000 in the bank. (See 
Exhibit 9, tab E to the Addendum to Brief of Appellant). There 
was no need to maintain any additional cash reserve or at least 
the Respondent did not testify to any additional cash reserve 
need. Therefore, all net profit after 1989 could have been and 
often was used by the Respondent. (In fact, after the year of 
the parties1 separation the company reserve account went steadily 
downward until it reached an all time low for the period of the 
accounting of under $8,000 at about the time of the trial). 
While Derk Rasmussen, CPA did testify that the corporation 
retained some of its net income he never testified that Mr. 
Thomas "did not receive any benefit from that money" 
(Respondent's Brief at page 11). Additionally, he testified that 
he did not believe that it was good tax planning for the 
corporation to retain net income. (Trial Transcript, Volume 2, 
Page 132, Lines 10-13). 
The Court and Mr. Rasmussen both determined that there was 
nothing illegal in how the books of the construction company and 
the leasing company were kept. The goal was to determine the 
cash available to the Respondent within the provisions of §78-45-
7.5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) which is different than the 
IRS test for taxable income. It is the IRS test for taxable 
income that the Respondent asserts as the appropriate measure of 
his income for child support and alimony purposes. 
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Mr. Thomas testified that the trend for gross revenues of 
the company was steadily increasing up until separation. 
Additionally, Mr. Thomas and Derk Rasmussen, CPA testified that 
the trend in the area for residential construction was steadily 
increasing. (Finding of Fact, paragraph 104 and Petitioner's 
Exhibit 13). In determining that the Respondent's sharp decrease 
in income during the pendency of the case was "inexplicable", the 
Court rejected the Respondent's testimony that his income was 
affected by his new found paternal responsibilities or the fact 
that Ms. Thomas no longer helped in the business4. Obviously, 
the Court had inadequate factual basis upon which to make its 
finding. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court concluded and found that it was clearly in the 
best interests of the children for Ms. Thomas to be awarded 
custody except for one factor. The Court, therefore, found 
contrary to the clear weight of all of the evidence and awarded 
custody to Mr. Thomas because of the "influence" of "Senor" Pedro 
Sauer. The findings regarding Mr. Sauer's "influence" and 
character are based upon faulty and inconsistent findings 
regarding criminal charges and charges of spouse abuse which were 
not supported by any conviction or finding in any other 
proceeding or by the evidence in this case. More important, the 
4Ms. Thomas' involvement in the business is one of the 
reasons she lays claim to the cash reserve account which existed 
at the time of separation and was dissipated during the pendency 
of the case. (See Point V herein). 
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Court's disapproval of Mr. Sauer included findings regarding his 
nationality and the Court's personal experience with Brazilian 
culture and its impact upon male members upon that society. 
There was no evidence to link Mr. Sauer's influence with Ms. 
Thomas' parenting ability or the best interests of the children. 
The Court gave undue weight to its findings regarding Mr. Sauer's 
character and influence. 
The Court did not explain why alimony should terminate after 
three years commencing with the temporary order in the case. 
Absent some findings to support an early termination of alimony, 
it should have continued until modified in subsequent proceedings 
or limited by the Utah statute. 
The home of the parties should have been categorized as a 
marital asset. This conclusion should have been made because of 
the nature of the asset, the fact that it was substantially 
constructed during the marriage, because it was owned jointly by 
the parties, and mortgaged and paid for during the marriage with 
marital funds. 
The family corporation included almost $40,000 in cash at 
the time of separation. These funds were dissipated by the 
Respondent in part to pay his obligation to the temporary order. 
In addition, the Respondent lived off of those funds when his 
income "inexplicably" and sharply dropped during the pendency of 
this action. These funds should have been included in the value 
of the company and equitably divided between the parties. 
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The Court did not err in determining that Mr. Thomas earns 
$69,557 dollar per year or has the capacity to do so based upon 
his history and ability• The Court did not err in including 
company net profits in the cash available to the Respondent for 
purposes of determining child support and alimony under the 
applicable statute. Mr. Thomas could withdraw and benefit from 
those funds and, in fact, did so before and after separation. 
DATED THIS /^ day of November, 1998. 
GREEN & BERRY 
F^REDERICK N. GREEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Frederick N. Green, certify that on the [2— day of 
November, 1998, I served a copy of the attached Appellant's Reply 
Brief upon Brent D. Young, Esq. the counsel for Appellee in this 
matter by mailing a copy by first class mail with sufficient 
postage prepaid to the following address: 48 North University 
Avenue, P.O. Box 657, Provo, Utah 84603. 
CDERICK N. GREEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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